How to Break China’s Grip on the Batteries Powering Our Military
It’s tough medicine but Congress must use the pending defense policy bill to bar the Department of War from using lithium-ion cells in its weapon systems that are supplied by Beijing.
When China temporarily halted the supply of lithium-ion battery cells to Pentagon drone maker Skydio last year, co-founder and CEO Adam Bry called it “a clarifying moment.”
“If there was ever any doubt, this action makes clear that the Chinese government will use supply chains as a weapon to advance their interests over ours,” he remarked at the time.
The company was forced to take the “drastic step” of rationing batteries from three to one per drone, while it is still searching for alternative suppliers.
Yet this unique vulnerability is far greater than many realize or are willing to admit. Countless other specialized U.S. military systems, including handheld radios, autonomous submersibles, and next generation platforms like directed energy weapons, rely on lithium-ion batteries and related materials.
As the Department of Defense warned in its landmark Lithium Battery Strategy, it is similarly dependent on a variety of Chinese battery components and materials like graphite anodes, electrolyte salts, as well as other key ingredients such as the metals nickel and cobalt.
“Current dependence on potential adversaries for battery materials, coupled with the proliferation of DoD unique battery designs, creates challenges in securing critical battery supply chains,” the strategy stated. “At the same time, skyrocketing demand for electric vehicles is driving the commercial market away from the smaller cell formats on which DoD depends.”
The good news is Congress can break China’s chokehold – and begin reducing an unacceptable national security risk that could leave our armed forces at the mercy of the enemy in a protracted conflict.
The House version of the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act that is currently being negotiated with the Senate contains a series of provisions that would require the Pentagon to ensure advanced battery materials from China and other adversarial entities are no longer “a substantial or essential component” in equipment, services, or to power military bases. The proposed legislation calls for 95 percent of the value of batteries to be sourced from non-adversarial countries by 2027.
The United States and its allies are more than capable of making state-of-the-art batteries and materials, including producing the cells required by our armed forces. But our private-sector innovators simply cannot compete on cost with Beijing, which has subsidized its home-grown industry for decades.
We realize that forcing the Pentagon and its contractors to kick the Chinese habit will not be without challenges.
American and allied companies will not be able to fill the gap overnight. For suppliers that cannot meet the proposed timeline, the House bill stipulates that a waiver can be granted in exchange for outlining a step-by-step strategy to move away from the Chinese supply chain. Specific weapons can also be exempted from the mandate when acquisition of Chinese battery materials “is necessary to the national security interest of the United States.”
But the harsh reality is that our industries will never be able to compete with Beijing in this critical sub-market unless there is a forcing function. For years, the defense acquisition process has defaulted to the lowest cost, technically acceptable solution. We must make a fundamental change in that practice, by embracing solutions and supply chains closer to home that are not dependent upon or controlled by our adversaries.
The proposed battery sourcing requirement can play an integral role in fostering more robust and agile supply chains, both domestically and in allied nations. Our battery markets are tailored for electric vehicle applications due to the much higher volumes. In the process, we have effectively ceded smaller markets like defense applications to China, who’s dominant position enables it to produce the specialized cells needed in lower volumes for lower cost.
This only widens the infamous “Valley of Death” that prevents U.S. companies from monetizing their technology until they are at EV scale quantities. A requirement for U.S. military equipment to source non-Chinese materials and cells, however, would give the domestic supply chain the much-needed demand to innovate and scale more organically.
The House provision would most importantly compel government contractors to identify their supply chain gaps for these technologies and materials and assess what resources they need for us to move away from China.
Despite the time, investment, and new acquisition approaches that will be required to ramp up this supply chain, the status quo is simply far too dangerous.
As the DoD battery strategy stated, “DoD must adapt quickly to leverage domestic and allied mining, processing, and battery production investments that make it possible to domestically manufacture the lithium-ion cells and battery packs that support our systems safely and affordably.”
In failing to do so, China could be further emboldened to bully the United States by choking the supply of more materials. We’ve already seen signs of this with their recently announced export controls on lithium-ion batteries and tighter limits on critical inputs like rare-earth minerals and magnets. While Beijing has partially backtracked for now, its actions have highlighted the enduring vulnerability for our national security.
We believe American industry is ready to begin filling this critical gap in our national defense, but first we need must get Chinese batteries out of the U.S. military. The Senate must follow the House and pass a defense bill this year that makes it law.
By Samm Gillard & Drew Ronneberg
Gillard is executive director, and Ronneberg is policy director of the BATT Coalition, which advocates for policies that enable the domestic production and recycling of battery materials and components by maximizing market incentives and trade protections to grow the U.S. supply chain.